Early in this century, Judge Learned Hand reportedly remarked that he "would fear nothing save death or sickness as much as he would fear litigation." ' The intervening years from his time to our own have brought no relief from the frustration of pursuing a claim in court. For litigants, long delays and high costs characterize the traditional judicial process, 2 while for judges there is mounting pressure to manage cases aggressively from initial filing to final disposition in order to control the growth of the civil docket. 3 Only lawyers remain unper- REV. 199, 199 (1985) (noting the negative financial and emotional effect of litigation on litigants and discussing the need to conserve legal resources); Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1984) (stating that the modem "pretrial structure permits artful attorneys to hide the ball and keep alive hopeless claims, as well as defenses, for a much longer time than was possible" under the old procedural system). Resolution Act of 1987 ("FADR Act"), 5 if passed, would likely form the basis of a model act of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws." 6 In New Jersey and at the federal level, the new ADR system would not replace existing procedures, but rather would serve as another option that parties may choose as they plan for dispute resolution.
This Comment evaluates the new dispute resolution procedures created by the NJADR Act both as the synthesis of responses to popular arguments for and against alternative dispute resolution, and as the precursor of similar statutes at the federal and state levels. The issues addressed are of pressing concern: criticism of the ADR movement has increased in recent years," yet the sense of institutional crisis afflicting the courts has never been more profound."' The scope of this Comment will be limited to the commercial arbitration context because, while such arbitration closely resembles litigation in form, its informality and articulated goal of achieving repose 9 as quickly and inexpensively as possible is shared by all forms of ADR. 2 " Part I of this Comment discusses the arbitration process in commercial cases. The discussion encompasses a description of the statutory and judicial treatment of arbitration past and present, a synopsis of common arbitration procedure, and an examination of the asserted benefits of arbitration. Part II compares the relative costs and benefits of arbitration and litigation, with particular consideration of their practical and the jurisprudential aspects. To illustrate the theoretical points made in this discussion, Part II concludes with a case study of a major commercial dispute recently resolved by arbitration. The goal is to demonstrate that although arbitration offers many practical efficiencies, it also presents jurisprudential inefficiencies. Specifically, the rapid repose promised by arbitration is often achieved at the expense of the vindication of public rights. Part III evaluates the NJADR Act as a means of dispute resolution by comparing it with the conventional methods of commercial arbitration and litigation. This Comment concludes that, despite some shortcomings, the procedural format of the NJADR Act presents a respectable response to the ADR debate, and 15 H.R. 2721, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987 one that may satisfy equally both court administrators and jurisprudential scholars.
I. A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

A. History
Arbitration is the submission of a dispute by the parties involved to one or more impartial persons for a final and binding decision issued after a hearing at which both parties have had an opportunity to be heard." 1 It has a long history as a means of dispute resolution, but, until recently, judicial attitudes toward arbitration have been rather ambivalent. 22 At common law, courts rarely enforced agreements to arbitrate, because arbitration was thought to "oust" the jurisdiction of the courts. 2 3 When one considers that early English judges were dependent upon filing fees for their salaries, the origin of this hostility is easy to understand. 2 4 This judicial attitude, transported intact to the United States, was so slow to change 2 5 that legislatures were forced to intervene and provide explicitly for judicial enforcement of contractual arbitration agreements. In 1925 Congress passed the United States Arbitration Act, 2 6 commonly known as the Federal Arbitration Act 23 For a discussion of the "ouster" concept, see, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Co., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942) (tracing the development of ouster in English common law and noting its adoption by American courts). 24 See id. at 983 n.14; Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235, 241 (1979) . 25 See, e.g., Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 14,065) (Story, J.) (" [Arbitrators] are not ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity [I to administer either effectually, in complicated cases; and hence it has often been said, that the judgment of arbitrators is but rusticum judicium.").
26 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. § § 1-14 (1982)). Congress enacted title 9 of the U.S. Code with the Act of July 30, 1947, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 669, entitled "Arbitration," which repealed the name "United States Arbitration Act," see id. § 14, 61 Stat. at 674. The FAA was intended to "revers[el centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements." Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
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("FAA"), 2 " and today almost every state has enacted some sort of arbitration legislation. 28 The federal courts were reluctant to follow this explicit expression of legislative policy, but gradually the historic judicial mistrust of the arbitration process gave way to a more tolerant attitude. In recent years the Supreme Court has repeatedly enforced agreements to arbitrate, even in cases involving antitrust or other statutory claims." 0 Although enforcement policies in state courts vary under state statutes, the Court's decision in Southland Corporation v. Keating 3 1 made it clear that the FAA expressed a national policy favoring arbitration and "withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties had agreed to resolve by arbitration." 3 2 Consequently, as long as an arbitration clause is itself valid, 3 the agreement to arbitrate will be enforced by the courts.
B. Procedure
In most arbitrations, the parties have agreed in advance through a contractual arbitration clause to resolve their disputes in this alternative forum. Such a clause typically will provide for the arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this contract, or the 35 the courts will interpret broadly the scope of the arbitration clause; unless the claim alleges fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause itself, it must be submitted to arbitration. 36 Even disputes as to the scope of the arbitration clause, or a claim that the entire contract was fraudulently induced, must be arbitrated. 37 The arbitration clause usually specifies the source of the rules under which the dispute is to be resolved. Arbitration procedures vary because they are administered by a number of entities, such as securities and commodities exchanges, trade associations, and the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"). Since the AAA is "the leading agency for the administration of every type of arbitration," ' 3 8 this Comment will use its commercial arbitration rules to represent those of commercial arbitration generally. 39 Under AAA rules, a party initiates the dispute resolution process by filing a written demand for arbitration with the Association and serving a copy on the offending party by mail."' The standard AAA Demand for Arbitration Form gives little information as to the nature of the claim, leaving only one inch of space in which to state it.4' Thus, right from the beginning, the arbitration process streamlines those procedures employed in conventional litigation.
After the claim (and any counterclaim) has been filed and shown to be arbitrable, 4 2 the AAA, with input from the parties, chooses the arbitrator or arbitrators. The AAA maintains a roster of arbitrators who are experts in particular fields, as well as biographies of each to be made available to the parties. After it is contacted by the parties, the AAA sends each side a list of potential arbitrators, from which the parties strike off those they find objectionable. Each list is then returned to the AAA, which chooses a mutually acceptable arbitrator or panel. 4 3 The president of the AAA has noted that "[s]electing an arbitrator is the most critical step in arbitration.""" The principal value of arbitration is said to reside in the procedures that operate between the initial filing and the final award. Although there is no requirement that they do so, most parties choose to be represented by legal counsel. 45 AAA procedural rules are quite simple, and generally remain so despite the parties' freedom to make them more complex by mutual agreement. For example, AAA rules do not explicitly provide for pretrial discovery, but the parties may agree between themselves to cooperate and exchange information."' A major break with the formality of a trial is the lack of either common law or statutory rules of evidence. 47 The actual hearing is conducted privately, and no transcript is kept unless the parties request and pay for it. 48 The conduct of the hearing superficially resembles a trial: each side may make an opening statement, present its case, and cross-examine hostile witnesses. 4 The hearing room atmosphere, however, is decidedly less formal than the 42 Although exploration of the issue is beyond the scope of this Comment, the arbitrability of a claim may itself be disputed by the parties. solemnity of the courtroom. 50 The award itself must be written" 1 and submitted within thirty days of the hearing's conclusion. 2 The award need not be accompanied by an opinion explaining findings of fact and conclusions of law, and usually is not. 53 Thus, the arbitrator is free to decide the claim and fashion a remedy according to her own sense of fairness. After the award is made, the prevailing party may then have it enforced by a court of proper jurisdiction. 5 4 Review is extremely deferential; a court will generally uphold the award unless the arbitrator has grossly abused her powers 55 or there is some evidence that the arbitration award was fraudulently induced. 56
C. The Advantages of Arbitration
Parties selecting ADR mechanisms generally, and arbitration in particular, are most interested in rapid and efficient dispute resolution. 51 Other purported benefits include a private forum that avoids unwelcome publicity, 5 preservation of good will between the parties, 5 9 the specialized expertise of the arbitrator in the subject matter of the dispute,° and freedom from being bound by established rules of law in resolving the dispute and designing a remedy. 6 While the informality of the hearing readily achieves the primary goals of speed and low cost, several other provisions are important complements to meeting these goals. For example, having a dispute resolved by an expert in the industry to which the controversy relates saves the time and expense involved in educating a generalist judge or jury in the subject matter of the dispute."' In addition, dispute resolution through arbitration should generate fewer appeals, in part because judicial policies favor limited review and the enforcement of arbitration awards, and in part because arbitrators need not apply law correctly or issue a written opinion. The disappointed party and any reviewing court are thereby rendered ignorant of the grounds for appeal. As a result, a party choosing arbitration can expect greater finality from the arbitrated decision, reducing the likelihood of expensive and time-consuming appellate procedures. 6 4 The relaxed procedural rules also preclude burdensome pretrial strategizing and manuevering, permitting the parties to focus on the substantive issues. By eliminating extensive discovery, arbitration removes a primary source of frustration for both commercial litigants and trial judges. 6 485, 487 (1985) ("the quality of dispute resolution is improved when models other than formal adjudication are used"); see also PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 8 (There is hope that ADR '"will provide more satisfying means to justice for a larger portion of the population." who frankly admitted that they were becoming wealthy primarily because of fees attributable to discovery expressed amazement and concern about the rapid escalation of the expense of conducting and complying with discovery."); Levin & Colliers, supra note 4, at 231-32 (placing much of the blame for rising legal expenses on discovery); Miller, supra note 2, at 9 (characterizing discovery as "a debilitating and often interminable process"); Resnik, supra note 8, at 542 (describing lawyers and judges as " [b] ored with the tedium of writing, answering, and ruling upon discovery requests").
The additional cost and delay related to the discovery process do not necessarily result from abusive tactics by attorneys. See Levin & Colliers, supra note 4, at 234 (studies show that discovery abuse is not common at either the state or federal court level).
[Vol. 136:1723 business relationships probably stem from use of discovery as a weapon of obfuscation. Therefore, if the parties are involved in a long-term and profitable contractual relationship, they may sensibly want to avoid these potentially harmful effects by choosing the arbitration forum. 6 6 Finally, the parties usually perceive the results of arbitration as fair. 67 One reason for this is the arbitrator's ability to fashion a compromise remedy, granting the prevailing party less than might have been received in court, thereby reducing the sting of the adverse judgment on the losing party. 8 As long as the arbitrator does not need-to justify legally her decision, she is free to fashion this sort of compromise. In the end, both parties realize some degree of satisfaction and will return to the arbitration forum in the future.
The policies presently broadening the range of arbitrable claims and the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate 69 are not antithetical to the judicial process. There is a demand and a need for this alternative forum, as there has been for hundreds of years: arbitration settles many disputes as quickly, quietly, and painlessly as possible. But a growing number of observers have recognized that arbitration and litigation are not interchangeable means of dispute resolution, and that to treat them as such when particular types of claims are involved is dangerous.
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The procedural benefits are clear, but the substantive costs are only beginning to become obvious.
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROCESS CHOICE
A number of commentators have advocated the substitution of ADR procedures, whenever possible, to relieve the bursting dockets and rising costs of traditional litigation. Their advocacy is fueled by a concern for both efficiency and quality of resolution.
7 ' The legal community generally accepts the need for an alternative forum for dispute resolution, and the claim that many disputes can be disposed of adequately outside the judicial system. More recently, however, other commenta-66 Paradoxically, informality may have the effect of causing future disputes. See
Fuller, supra note 60, at 388 ("[W]here a decision enters into some continuing relationship, if no reasons are given the parties will almost inevitably guess at reasons and act accordingly."). Thus, while arbitration may reduce or eliminate the antagonisms of litigation, it could be inefficient in the long run by failing to alter the type of behavior that led to the breakdown. tors have begun to express wariness at the fervency and scope of the ADR movement.7 2 While acknowledging that ADR serves an important function as a safety valve for frustrated litigants and an overburdened judicial system, these commentators argue with increasing stridency that the attributes and safeguards of court adjudication are unmatched by any existing system of ADR. 3 Indeed, no rational argument in favor of ADR can deny the vital function that traditional litigation fulfills in society." 4 When disputes involve issues of legal or constitutional interpretation, or public rights," 5 formal adjudication should be the only valid form of resolution. A paradox is revealed when private rights are implicated. Although courts are necessary to protect private rights, and the judicial system depends on private litigants to pursue these rights, 7 6 long delays and high costs may " See Brunet, supra note 8, at 3-4; see also Stroh Container Co. v. Delphi Indus., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir.) ("The present day penchant for arbitration may obscure for many parties who do not have the benefit of hindsight that the arbitration system is an inferior system of justice, structured without due process, rules of evidence, accountability of judgment and rules of law."), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1141 (1986) .
"' The purpose of adjudication "is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with them." Fiss, supra note 8, at 1085; see also Edwards, supra note 7, at 676 ("An oft-forgotten virtue of adjudication is that it ensures the proper resolution and application of public values.").
" "Public policy should be invoked to prevent arbitration when at issue is a legislative expression or a basic case law principle designed for some purpose other than to foster justice between the parties to the dispute. render the courts inaccessible, and therefore incapable of effectively performing this enforcement function. 77 Arbitration may provide an accessible and efficient forum for dispute resolution, but its procedural advantages may mask some serious substantive shortcomings. Against the considerable weight of legislative policy and judicial opinion, scholars have rightfully begun to question a balance that accords more weight to expeditious repose than to the quality of justice dispensed."
The following discussion assesses these comparative criticisms. To illustrate the difficulties of balancing procedural and substantive concerns while maintaining the positive aspects of ADR, this Part concludes with an examination of a recent commercial arbitration decision between two of the world's largest corporations.
A. Process Choice: A Matter of Pragmatism or Misapprehension?
The Myth of the Litigation Explosion
A party may choose an arbitration forum for a variety of reasons; 7 9 the most common reason, however, is to avoid the much-discussed, yet ill-perceived, "crisis in the courts. si See PATHS TO JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 7; Edwards, supra note 2, at 877. both emotional frustration and financial loss, but commentators have mistakenly placed the blame upon an overly litigious society and a concomitant "litigation explosion." 2 Statistics show that between 1960 and 1983 the number of filings per capita in federal district courts tripled, s " which may suggest that people have become more willing and able to assert their rights in court."' On the other hand, the increase is quite reasonable given the immense social and technological changes in this country over that period." 5 Moreover, while the number of filings has grown, the number of cases actually litigated has remained constant with the rate of population growth.""
The sense of institutional crisis said to be enveloping the judicial system is not so much a problem of excessive litigiousness or immense Current statistics indicate that the strain upon judicial resources in the federal courts is easing. In 1986, civil filings in the districts courts declined 13%, to the lowest level since 1982, and the rate of increase in the filing of appeals in the circuit courts also slowed. 82 See, e.g., Galanter, supra note 80, at 61 (the widespread perception of a litigation explosion is skewed by input from elite academic, practitioner, and federal judicial positions); Howard, Our Litigious Society, 38 S.C.L. REV. 365, 366-67 (1987) (studies of pre-twentieth century American urban and rural areas indicate significantly more litigiousness than exists today). 82 See R. POSNER, supra note 2, at 63-64. Professor Galanter analyzed this increase and found that 75% of it has come from just five categories of cases. In fact, the federal government alone has accounted for 50% of the increase in filings through a 413% rise in social security cases and a 6,683% rise in overpayment recovery cases. [Vol. 136:1723 caseloads as it is of increasingly complex civil litigation," 7 irrationally high legal fees, 8 and the vexing delays that continue to mount despite increased emphasis by the judiciary on docket management. 8 9 Still, these myths contain enough grains of truth and have invaded the popular imagination to such an extent 90 that demands for alternative forums of dispute resolution have continued to intensify. The judicial system itself has been quick to embrace mandatory court-annexed arbitration" 1 as a means of resolving cases before trial.
One commentator has described this shift from court adjudication to ADR as the emergence of desirable, efficiency-producing competition. 92 Before hailing the arbitration alternative as equal or superior to 90 See Galanter, supra note 83, at 3-5. 91 Court-annexed arbitration may be defined as the process requiring "that civil cases involving claims for damages between the ceiling for small claims and a higher amount (usually $10,000) be submitted to arbitration by court-sponsored panels of attorneys. Either party has the right to appeal the judgment of the arbitration panel." COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 3:25 (Practice Guide 92 See Brunet, supra note 8, at 7 ("Competition produces shifts towards efficiency and creates a healthy environment in which rival dispensers of dispute resolution seek to satisfy perceived demands."). But see Carrington, supra note 1, at 303-05 (arguing that cooperation, not competition, characterizes the relationship between private and public judicial services, since public institutions are "reluctant suppliers," not willing sellers, of such services).
litigation, however, it would be wise to examine popular notions regarding the advantages of that forum and the frequently overlooked costs associated with its procedural shortcuts.
2. Dispute Resolution: Means to an End, or the End Itself?
The procedural structure of arbitration has been demonstrated using the AAA Commercial Arbitration Rules as the exemplar. 93 Repose is the ultimate goal; the methods are strictly utilitarian. 94 Since cost and delay are regarded as the twin evils of litigation, each rule of arbitration is directed toward offering the benefits of fast and inexpensive dispute resolution in a private forum by means of informal procedures intended to reduce the likelihood of subsequent judicial involvement. 95 In most cases an arbitration begins quietly and intentionally remains so, even after the dispute is resolved. 6 Such privacy is in marked contrast to cases that are litigated, because the function of court adjudication is not only to achieve repose between the parties, but also to enforce accepted norms of behavior and guide future behavior through the creation of new norms.' However, the procedural devices associated with litigation, like discovery and the jury trial, cause frustration with the judicial process by fostering increased delay, expense, and unpredictability. 98 Disputants are also discouraged by the combative nature of the adversary system, its procedural inflexibility, and the public aspects of adjudication. 9 9 9' See supra notes 34-56 and accompanying text. 9 See Terrell, supra note 8, at 550-51. 9 Courts have long recognized the purpose of commercial arbitration and the concomitant substantive risk that the parties assume. See, e.g., American Almond Prods. Co. v. Consolidated Pecan Sales Co., 144 F.2d 448, 451 (2d Cir. 1944) (parties choosing arbitration "must content themselves with looser approximations to the enforcement of their rights than those that the law accords them," because arbitration is designed to avoid the procedural formalities that litigation employs to protect those rights).
" But see infra notes 153-69 and accompanying text (IBM-Fujitsu dispute). 
a. Framing the Dispute
Procedural differences with substantive consequences between arbitration and adjudication begin when a complaint is filed to initiate proceedings. Although most courts require only notice pleading from litigants, which is satisfied by a bare statement of the relevant facts and issues, 0 0 a demand letter stating a party's intention to seek arbitration communicates even less information to the opposing party.' 0 ' Moreover, the lack of formal discovery means that a party cannot readily make up that factual shortfall. Accordingly, the capacity to formulate legal arguments is diminished:" 0 2 "Lawyers have little opportunity to know the extent of the issues or to limit them before the hearing."' 013 A harsh consequence is that the party with fewer resources is likely to be at a substantial disadvantage when the hearing date arrives. 0 4 And as a rule, the inability to limit the scope of the issues contested at the hearing will waste time and perhaps confuse the arbitrator by clouding the most relevant points of the dispute.
b. The Arbitrator
The selection of the arbitrator has been called the lawyer's most Times, Sept. 13, 1987, at A2, col. 3 (The "lack of opportunity to review documents before a hearing in an antitrust case can be fatal to the plaintiff's chances for success."). The problem of unequal bargaining power, however, can arise in any commercial context. See Lieberman & Henry, supra note 67, at 431 ("The party with the more meritorious claim might not prevail because he is too poor to amass the requisite evidence through the discovery process.").
When arbitration rules state that an arbitration clause is valid and enforceable except "upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23A-2(a) (West 1987), this prohibition includes the inequality of bargaining power represented by an adhesion contract. The submission of a dispute to arbitration must be truly voluntary by both parties and not the result of a clause contained in a standard form printed contract presented to one party on a "take it or leave it" basis. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 9, § 5:04. In reality, however, "the courts have not favored recognition of the 'adhesive' arbitration clause." crucial decision, 10 5 because she will determine what law, if any, is to apply to the facts of the case. Proponents of arbitration view this as one of its chief benefits, because the parties may choose arbitrators who are experts in a given field to decide matters.' Thus, the parties benefit from the arbitrator's specialized knowledge of the trade or industry involved.' 0 7 Rather than wasting time educating a generalist judge or jury in the customs and practices of a particular field, the parties are able to concentrate their efforts upon resolving the dispute as speedily as possible.
Nevertheless, the use of experts presents potential problems. Arbitrators familiar with an industry's practices and the reputations of its members may bring with them not only specialized knowledge, but also the excess baggage of deeply ingrained beliefs and prejudices.' 0 8 Rather than presuming that it is always better to have a dispute resolved by someone familiar with the trade, prior knowledge must be balanced against the possible loss of impartiality. Not only might the generalist judge or jury bring a fresh approach to the problem, but the judicial system normally presides over a dispute without expertise in its underlying factual milieu." 9 Perhaps the cost of educating the generalist is merely the price to be paid for impartiality.
c. Discovery
The absence of elaborate pretrial discovery may be arbitration's most efficient procedural innovation, since discovery is often a lightning rod for criticism of traditional civil litigation." 0 Although parties may agree to exchange information, notwithstanding the relatively amicable nature of the proceedings, there is likely to be little cooperation. The FAA and some state arbitration statutes give arbitrators the power to subpoena documents and witnesses; 1 but there is undoubtedly less Pretrial discovery battles often serve to expose the worst aspects of the adversary system,"' and the limitations placed on such tactics in traditional ADR are reasonable in the routine cases involving repetitive facts and settled principles of law that make up the bulk of commercial arbitrations." Discovery abuses may well be an important factor underlying the "failing faith" in traditional adjudication, and perhaps rightfully so. 1 4 Discovery is, nonetheless, crucial to the process of developing facts fairly, and only by knowing the facts can a decisionmaker possibly resolve a dispute accurately." 5 Moreover, without adequate development of the facts, substantive law may not be correctly applied to the case." 6 Disputants choosing arbitration must be willing, therefore, to forego the degree of accuracy that litigation provides through its provisions for regulated factfinding and reliance upon established legal principles." 7 Similarly, "[t]o permit enforcement of the arbitration clause, [a] jurisdiction must be willing to permit the parties to contract not only out of dispute resolution in its courts, but also out of dispute resolution according to its laws."" ' Clearly, a private party may waive the right to have a claim based upon private rights resolved in a judicial forum."' But these are not the troublesome cases; rather, what is disdiscovery.").
" ) ("Article III's guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver, just as are other personal constitutional rights that dictate procedures by which civil and criminal matters must be tried."). Nevertheless, parties wishing to avoid the arbitration forum frequently dispute whether there was a waiver at all. In a case recently decided by the Seventh Circuit, a commodities brokerage firm argued that membership in a voluntary trade association did not constitute consent to the association's rule requiring arbitration of customer grievances, and thus there was no waiver of the constitutional right to a judicial forum. See Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity turbing is the willingness of litigants, the legislature, and the courts to elevate the achievement of repose as an end in itself, without regard to the actual quality of a decision or the dispute resolution process.
Resolution Without Reason: The Problem of Unsupported Awards
By dispensing with written opinions, commercial arbitration's rulemakers affirm that the correct application of substantive law to a dispute is relatively unimportant among ADR's several goals."' 0 Presumably, it is equally unimportant to those who choose an alternative forum of dispute resolution. Indeed, the president of the AAA actively discourages arbitrators from issuing written decisions, because doing so would facilitate an attack on the award by the losing party and subsequent judicial review. 1 " 1 The upshot of written arbitration opinions would be to undercut expeditious dispute resolution by impairing the finality of the arbitrator's decision.' 22 Because this result is inconsistent with the concept of arbitration, which intends to provide an alternative to the formalities, the delay, the expense, and the vexation of ordinary litigation, no written opinion is required.
Without a full development of the facts by the parties, and perhaps possessing only a nodding acquaintance with relevant substantive law, it may be unclear how the arbitrator actually arrives at her decision and the remedy to impose. The absence of a written opinion justifying the resolution clouds the reasoning process even further. Although ADR's proponents criticize litigation as capricious,' 2 3 a lack of predictability is perhaps arbitration's most irksome characteristic. The Geldermann court did recognize that a waiver may be ineffective when separation of powers principles are implicated. See id. at 321. The court, however, held that the arbitration rule in question did not "threaten[] the structural integrity of the courts or the separation of power between the branches of the federal government." Id. at 323.result in similarly situated parties, before the same or a different arbitrator, having their disputes resolved inconsistently based upon the decisionmaker's own notions of fairness. The principle of stare decisis, which would conflict with the expediency of arbitration by requiring a known and preserved body of law from which precedent could be applied, is reduced to irrelevance. 1 2 5
The most disturbing characteristic of arbitration decisionmaking is revealed by evidence that arbitrators frequently compromise on decisions rather than resolve the underlying dispute between the parties. 2 Ironically, without a written opinion, such a result is almost predictable. Considering that the parties normally select the arbitrators, and that the arbitrators only derive income when they work, it does not require much imagination to realize that an arbitrator has a strong interest in keeping everyone as happy as possible. a2 The best method of accomplishing this is compromise; thus, in the typical arbitration, neither side is as likely to prevail'as in the "winner-take-all" style of adjudication. 2 ' No rights are vindicated; rather, the controversy is swept under a rug and the parties are left reasonably-though perhaps only temporarily-content. That such contentment exacts a price from the rest of society is the subject of the next Section of this Comment.
B. The jurisprudential Functions of Litigation
Compromise decisions may be harmless in the routine high-voladjudication in some circumstances); Lasersohn, supra note 8, § 11, at 28, col. 2 (a lack of predictability is one of the primary complaints with arbitration).
125 Stare decisis is the judicial doctrine requiring a court to apply settled principles of law to a certain state of facts, thereby adhering to precedent. ( forty-six percent of attorneys responding agreed that arbitrators sometimes "unjustifiably render a compromise decision"). 127 See Bush, supra note 78, at 989 & n.204 (arguing that arbitrators must vary their rules of decision to avoid rejection by parties otherwise able to foresee defeat). On the other hand, the AAA contends that its arbitrators frequently volunteer their time or work for a nominal fee. In complicated cases, however, payment will likely be required. See Coulson, supra note 38, at 681. "28 Proponents of ADR view compromise as a qualitative benefit. See, e.g., Lieberman & Henry, supra note 67, at 429 (freedom from legal principles allows creative remedies that benefit both parties).
ume, low-stakes disputes that arbitration was designed to resolve quickly and inexpensively. 129 But from a jurisprudential standpoint, the consequent absence of identifiable decisional norms and the subjugation of individual rights in favor of achieving repose may threaten the proper administration of justice in both present and future cases. 130 One of ADR's foremost critics, Professor Owen Fiss, argues that "[a]djudication is more likely to do justice than . . . arbitration . . . or any other contrivance of ADR, precisely because it vests the power of the state in officials who act as trustees for the public, who are highly visible, and who are committed to reason. " 131 Arbitration's lack of procedural safeguards is less bothersome in the legally routine and factually repetitive cases that frequently develop during the term of a commercial contract." 3 2 In recent years, though, arbitration has been called upon to resolve claims based upon important public policies. 1 33 The American legal system depends upon the private enforcement of public as well as private rights, but a problem arises when issues of public law are hidden within seemingly private disputes. 1 4 Routinely resolving private disputes through arbitration or other forms of ADR may cause important public rights issues to be settled without much concern for the quality of the dispute resolution process.' 3 5 129 See Bush, supra note 78, at 990-91 (arbitration is more appropriate than adjudication in "routine cases involving purely factual issues," but not in cases involving "numerous or important questions of principle").
. 13" See Edwards, supra note 7, at 671 (issues of public law "include constitutional issues, issues surrounding existing government regulation, and issues of great public concern .. . .[that] might include, for example, the development of a legal standard of strict liability in products liability cases"); supra note 75 and accompanying text. 135 The failure of ADR's proponents to consider what is lost by diverting cases away from litigation has created what Professor Brunet calls the "Second Wave" of ADR analysis. See Brunet, supra note 8, at 4-6. While acknowledging the negative aspects of traditional court adjudication, this group of commentators emphasizes instead the advantages of the judicial system as a means of dispute resolution and the importance of its role in preserving the structure of society. Given the broad policies favoring [Vol. 136:1723
Beyond Fees: The Intangible Costs of Arbitration
The "adjudicatory mode" offers some theory of its own limits, distinguishing between, permissible and impermissible adjudication. ' Arbitration, by contrast, is legitimated only by its procedural advantages.' 3 Without safeguards, arbitration lacks an internal structure akin to the common law to impart similar consistency and value to decisions.' 38 The common law principle of stare decisis, for example, employs precedent established through adjudication in order to create that structure. Arbitration decisions, on the other hand, are specific to one dispute and have no lasting precedential value. 3 9 Arbitration, therefore, lacks the legal rules developed incrementally through relevant cases that, in traditional adjudication, legitimize past decisions and render future decisions more predictable. 4 ' Contracting parties can better plan their behavior according to clear and consistent legal rules as long as the parties are aware of the decisions and understand the rationale behind the ruling.' 4 '
If enough cases are diverted to arbitration, this rulemaking power exercised by the courts may be hindered. Besides functioning to resolve disputes, which arbitration also accomplishes quite well, litigation facilitates the development of a body of law and related rules that "serve to guide society." " 2 The creative ad hoc decisions characteristic of arbitration threaten to impair the role of legal norms in broadly guiding the actions of society, so that any major shift from adjudication to arbitration or other modes of ADR presents questions of "significant jurisprudential impact."'" 3 Compromise decisions play a large part in undermining substantive norms; indeed, "[t]he preference for compromise arbitration, these "Second Wave" concerns have become more pressing, and the pursuit of purely procedural goals more troubling. Elevating the value of efficient justice, they argue, may slight substantive process and substantive justice. 14' See Brunet, supra note 8, at 54 ("[S]ubstantive laws 'guide' or 'order' society generally and, in particular, affect large numbers of citizens who attempt to comply with positive law. . . .Law's guidance function requires clear, unambiguous norms to work effectively."); see also Terrell, supra note 8, at 545 ("The two basic functions of general rules in a legal system are to offer guidance concerning potential future action and to serve as standards for the assessment of past actions.").
142 Brunet, supra note 8, at 5.
erodes the very function of substantive law."' 44
In the context of considering private litigants as private attorneys general charged with enforcing public law and its underlying policies, 14 5 the debilitating effect of compromise decisions becomes clearer.
A statute is a legislative policy choice, but without subsequent judicial development through the public resolution of disputes, that policy will remain stagnant, or perhaps wither entirely. The ambiguous statutory language that frequently results from legislative compromise remains with the understanding that the courts will supply an interpretation. Even if initial principles are established through adjudication, permitting the arbitration of an entire category of claims restricts further evolution in that area of the law by reducing the number and variety of claims presented to the courts. This kind of substantive inefficiency, disregarded by litigation's critics, must be balanced against the more mundane efficiencies of time and cost that arbitration purports to offer. Without substantive norms, dispute resolution remains undisciplined and of no use to anyone but the disputants. Of course, an arbitrator is probably aware of the substantive law relevant to a dispute, 4 6 and may choose to apply it as best she can. However, similarly situated parties derive no benefit when there is no reasoned opinion to explain her decisionmaking process. Thus, although arbitration represents procedural reform, the practice of hearing every claim as if it were presented tabula rasa would seem to be an inefficient application of those reforms. Moreover, it allows procedural reform to "swallow substance.' 4 7
The suspect quality of arbitrated decisions should be considered by a reviewing court when the accuracy and basis of a decision is important.
4 " For example, one commentator has noted the troublesome practice of according preclusive effects to an arbitrated decision in a subsequent judicial proceeding. 49 Given the informal nature of most 44 Id. at 16. 145 See id. at 20-21. 146 This concept is referred to as "bargaining in the shadow of the law." Id. at 27-28; see also R. COULsON, supra note 53, at 31 (stating that an arbitrator is bound to listen to the parties' legal arguments and should consider them when rendering a decision). The pervasiveness of substantive law implies that legal principles influence ADR proceedings, although to an uncertain extent. See Brunet, supra note 8, at 27-28. arbitrations, and the uncertain basis of the arbitrator's decision, carelessly awarding the decision res judicata and collateral estoppel effects seems unfair. 15 Moreover, because the scope of an arbitration is governed by the contract that provides for it, carelessly according the decision preclusive effects may give the prevailing party more than the parties intended when they entered into the agreement. 5 1 Motivated in part by the perceived "litigation explosion," however, courts have freely applied preclusion doctrines to arbitration without weighing the differences in procedural regularity or the intent of the parties. 1 5 2 2. Case in Point: The IBM-Fujitsu Arbitration Decision A major case arbitrated under the auspices of the AAA brings to life many of the positive and negative characteristics of arbitration as compared to litigation, particularly the assertion that "ADR focuses on the ending of a dispute and the creation of a framework for avoiding future disputes.' 53 In that case, IBM, the largest computer manufacturer in the world, and Fujitsu, the largest Japanese computer manufacturer, resolved a long-standing battle over Fujitsu's development of IBM-compatible operating system software.1 5 4 Such development required access to information that IBM alone possessed, and IBM demanded compensation for the privilege of using that information. Since copyright law in this particular area remains unsettled, the parties could not agree whether such information was protected by law from unauthorized use.' 5 5 An earlier agreement between the parties requiring Fujitsu to make substantial semiannual payments for obtained in--formation had quickly collapsed under the weight of undefined terms. 5 ' Fujitsu had been selling the IBM-compatible software to its customers for a long time, so that large amounts of money and the good 150 See id. at 657-60. 151 See id. at 662. 152 See id. at 661. '-3 Brunet, supra note 8, at 14.
See IBM v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 13T-117-0636-85 (AAA Commercial Arbitration Tribunal Sept. 15, 1987) (Jones & Mnookin, Arbs). "An operating system is an organized collection of software used to assist and in part control the operations of a computer. Operating systems generally manage the internal functions of the computer and facilitate the use of applications software." Id. at 3-4. The operating system programs involved in this arbitration were large and complex, representing an investment of hundreds of millions of dollars. See id. at 4. 155 See id. at 5-6, 29 n.8. 155 See id. at 6-8. For example, Fujitsu promised to respect IBM's intellectual property rights, but the scope of those rights and the applicable law were not defined. See id. at 8. Moreover, neither the type of information obtainable by Fujitsu nor the price to be charged for its use was specified. See id.
will of many Fujitsu customers were at stake. 15 The arbitrators' remedy was so unique, and the stakes so high, that the AAA placed full-page advertisements announcing the decision in The Wall Street Journal and The New York Times. 5 The arbitrators' order resolved all past claims between the two parties and established a structure to inhibit future disputes. 5 9 The forward-looking agreement entailed the construction of a "Secured Facility" in which Fujitsu would be allowed to examine information possessed by IBM necessary to the continued production of compatible software. In return, IBM received a lump sum payment for past, present, and future use of its materials and for the substantial investment involved in their development-a de facto license obtained by Fujitsu. 60 IBM was given the right to examine Fujitsu data, but does not expect to exercise it. A neutral third party, supervised by the arbitrators, will strictly control this exchange process for the duration of the agreement-a period of between five and ten years.
1 61 Information properly obtained by either side at the Secured Facility will be immune from claims of copyright infringement.' 6 2
The nature of this remedy underscores both the flexibility available to disputants choosing arbitration and the benefit of having experts serve as arbitrators. One of the arbitrators is a retired computer expert, the other a law professor specializing in the study of alternative forms of dispute resolution.' 6 3 This expertise undoutedly assisted them in understanding the facts and fashioning an appropriate remedy. Moreover, the controversy was resolved in less than two years-substantially less time than might have been expected had the case been formally adjudicated. 164 Finally, the legal fees, while no doubt large, were most likely smaller than they would have been had the dispute been litigated.
The order also achieved a consistent outcome between the parties, a substantial benefit given the size of the stakes involved. 6 ' IBM will have knowledge of Fujitsu's software development before the product hits the market, and Fujitsu knows that IBM cannot bring any claims against it related to material properly acquired at the'Secured Facility. Perhaps most important, a stable, working relationship was preserved between two powerful multinational corporations to both of their benefits and the benefit of their many customers. As one of the arbitrators noted, "It is because both companies prefer to devote resources to marketplace competition rather than copyright and contract battles that this order is possible."' 66 While it is the rare company that would prefer litigation to business as usual, the spirit of his assertion is accurate: economic resources were put to a more efficient use.
Lost, however, was an opportunity for the judicial system to further the substantive development in this particular area. The facts and issues involved in this controversy were rich; 167 the uncertainty of applicable copyright law would have sharpened the controversy. Although the parties were most concerned with the issue of compensation, the ultimate resolution of this concern was dependent upon whether or not IBM's intellectual property rights had been violated, an issue deemed too costly and time-consuming to resolve. ' Rather than having been permitted the opportunity to settle an area of intellectual property law, society has been left to interpret the meaning and relevance of a compromise decision. Computers pervade society, and their influence can only expand. If copyright law is to apply at all, courts should have an opportunity to direct the development of that law in relation to the computer industry. Although private parties are not obligated to litigate their disputes, IBM and Fujitsu had the resources to obtain the best legal talent available and withstand the financial burden of adjudication.' 69 "6 Arbitrator R. Mnookin, Statement at Press Conference 4 (Sept. 15, 1987) [hereinafter Mnookin Statement] (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 7 See id. at 12 ("The Panel has received an astounding volume of letters, memoranda, documents and exhibits on numerous points and issues.").
I68 See id. at 3. As Fujitsu's lead counsel explained with unintended irony, "Existing copyright doctrine is not particularly well-suited, in our view, to resolution of computer software development issues. We believe alternative methods of dispute resolution, such as those employed in this arbitration, are more likely to produce rational answers to these issues than conventional litigation procedures." R. Raven, Statement in Press Conference Press Kit Concerning the IBM-Fujitsu Dispute 1 (Sept. 15, 1987) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review). 169 The argument that private parties should not be expected to bear the additional costs of litigation would be persuasive if it were valid. However, the assumption that private parties usually spend more money in court is simply not true. 14-19 (1983) . Complex cases cost more in both forums, and publicly-funded courts actually cost less to use than the entirely fee-supported arbitra-The IBM-Fujitsu arbitration exposes the difficult questions generated by the growth of the ADR movement. It illustrates the costs incurred when issues on the cutting edge of the law are diverted to the various ADR systems: legal rules are denied a chance to evolve, to the detriment of the legal process. In this case, because the arbitrators were free to ignore copyright doctrine, an opportunity was squandered to refine that doctrine further.
Resolving this dispute in an alternative forum saved time and money and achieved repose between the parties. In addition, similarly situated parties on their own may adopt the creative remedy produced in this dispute, thereby eliminating the need for courts to revisit the factual and legal tangle that characterizes computer industry disputes. The failure to develop a new principle of intellectual property law, however, imposes broader costs upon society. The arbitrators' remedy in this case is temporary and applicable only to the two parties involved. As a result, other members of the industry have been denied the guidance that a legal rule would impart upon their dealings with one another, so that these companies may be forced to bear the costs of an adverse decision either in future court cases or arbitration decisions. Moreover, an eventual resolution of the larger legal issues was merely postponed, perhaps left to .smaller and less financially capable players to settle in court. Given these factors, many of the resources employed to arrive at the IBM-Fujitsu decision may have been wasted, from society's point of view.
Theoretically, judicial resolution would have governed the dealings of all similarly situated parties and achieved repose of the issues, at least temporarily. Frustration with the expense and delay of traditional litigation, however, encouraged the parties to pursue resolution in an alternative forum. Although the parties are satisfied with the resolution of their dispute, and finite judicial resources were conserved, the arbitration imposed substantive costs upon the parties and society. The tion forum. See id. at 17. No additional burden is imposed on private litigants if use of the courts is encouraged for particular disputes. Arbitration may be faster than adjudication, however, even with any subsequent appeals from the arbitrated award. See id. at 11-14, 18. Arguably, streamlined procedures could remove any disparity caused by delayed access to the courts.
Implicit in the result of the IBM-Fujitsu arbitration is the fact that what is best for private litigants is not necessarily best for society. The norms that society may derive from formal adjudication require the parties involved to endure "weighty opportunity costs." Brunet, supra note 8, at 51. Consequently, "the demand for judicially imposed substantive norm enforcement barely exists." Id. Thus, society cannot rely upon private parties to enter the public forum when an issue needs to be litigated if a satisfactory resolution of the dispute can be achieved in an alternative forum such as arbitration. In order to ensure that norms are created and enforced, the use of courts should be encouraged for particular types of cases.
[Vol. 136:1723 challenge remains to ameliorate these substantive costs as much as possible without sacrificing the procedural benefits of ADR generally, and arbitration in particular. The next Part of this Comment will explore the balance that must be struck between substantive norms and expeditious procedures.
III. THE NEW JERSEY ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURE FOR DISPUTE
RESOLUTION ACT
A. The Goal of Reform
The goal of ADR's reformers is to protect the quality of justice dispensed in alternative forums such as arbitration. 7 0 This Comment emphasizes the need for reform in commercial arbitration procedures so that statutory policies' will be adequately enforced and substantive law1 7 2 correctly applied.' 7 3 The NJADR Act provides the precise system of checks and balances suggested by this critique of arbitration, including streamlined procedures necessary for efficient repose and substantive safeguards necessary to protect public rights. 
12
See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. 171 See, e.g., Brunet, supra note 8, at 54-55 ("[P]rocedural innovation is needed to ensure that ADR, like any procedural reform, remains subordinate to substantive law."); Edwards, supra note 7, at 676-78 (arbitrators should be restricted to private disputes in order to protect established public rights); Shell, supra note 104, § 3, at 2, col. 3 (arguing that if antitrust disputes are to be arbitrated, procedures must be modified to protect the policies underlying antitrust laws). If the safeguards accompanying court adjudication are added to the arbitration structure, however, "have we done anything other than reinvent the wheel?" 1 5 If the primary motivation for choosing commercial arbitration is streamlined procedures, which have the concomitant benefits of speed and low cost, would not the addition of an elaborate judicial-type structure be self-defeating? If commercial arbitration becomes a replica of traditional litigation, then its attractiveness as a form of ADR will disappear, and its value as an alternative to litigation will be negated. As discussed below, however, the NJADR Act has balanced procedural reform with certain limiting principles, a compromise that may have successfully synthesized the best of both processes of dispute resolution . 17 stantive law").
As a result of this shift in the standard of review, and the fact that arbitrators rarely explain the reasons underlying an award, arbitration in New Jersey became more than ever a beginning to litigation rather than an end. Cf Grover, 80 N.J. at 237, 403 A.2d at 456 (Pashman, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's review of an arbitration proceeding was setting a precedent that would allow parties a hearing de novo, thus making arbitration a mere springboard to litigation). A disappointed party would almost always have an incentive to attack the award, because without an opinion setting forth the basis of the decision, it is difficult to determine the law that the arbitrator applied.
The New Jersey Supreme Court further confused this issue when it held in Heffner v. Jacobson, 100 N.J. 550, 498 A.2d 766 (1985) , that common law rules were applicable in statutory arbitration if the contract's arbitration clause was silent as to whether the common law or the arbitration statute applied to the underlying dispute between the parties. Heffner and Grover render the result under judicial review entirely dependent upon the standard of review applied, which in turn depends upon the rules under which the case has been arbitrated. See Lasersohn, supra note 8, § 11, at 28, col. 2. Arbitration awards under the state arbitration act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § § 2A:24-1-24-11 (West 1987), must be in accord with applicable law after Grover, but common law arbitration awards are still reviewed under the familiar "manifest disregard of the law" standard.
The additional unpredictability introduced into commercial arbitration by these decisions gave ADR reformers in New Jersey the incentive to devise a new structure for the nonjudicial resolution of commercial disputes. See Lasersohn, supra note 8, § 11, at 28, cols. 1-2; June Sturtz Statement, supra note 16, at 1-2.
'7 Resnik, supra note 8, at 554. 178 Similar to arbitration in many respects, the procedure established by the NJADR Act is meant to compete with existing forms of ADR rather than replace them outright. The procedure is entirely voluntary and must be designated by the parties as the source of rules governing dispute resolution. The heart of the Act is the provision requiring the umpires, the system's decisionmakers, to resolve disputes according to substantive law. 177 This requirement follows inevitably from the body of New Jersey case law holding arbitrators to an identical standard of accurate decisionmaking as judges. 1 8 Additionally, other procedural innovations were needed to facilitate the rendering of legally correct decisions. Thus, rather than focusing purely on achieving the rapid repose that arbitration promises, the NJADR Act seeks to enhance the quality of the result reached.'1 9 Critics dismiss the Act as an unnecessary hybrid of arbitration and litigation-a reinvention of the wheel.' 80 In fact, the NJADR Act is a careful blend of existing modes, offering procedural convenience and substantive protection,'' the goals of which are to confer predictability upon ADR decisionmaking and facilitate review of those decisions in the courts.' 8 2
B. The Act's Mechanism
Jurisdiction
As with statutory arbitration, the parties must voluntarily invoke the jurisdiction of the NJADR Act; they must either specify in the text of their agreement that any disputes arising under the contract will be resolved under the Act, or agree after the dispute has arisen to submit their claims to this process for resolution.' 8 3
Voluntary election underscores the fact that conventional arbitration is well suited to resolution of particular types of disputes, and that to force these into the NJADR Act procedures is inefficient. For example, if preservation of a business relationship is most important to the parties, as it was in the IBM-Fujitsu arbitration, efficiency will be the primary factor in choosing a mode of dispute resolution. Thus, although one could argue that the need for NJADR Act procedures in any context could be obviated by amending the FAA or state arbitraproblem is that it is often the start of litigation .... "); October Sturtz Statement, supra note 6, at 1-3. tion statutes, such additional procedures are superfluous in the average commercial dispute and would only prove to be burdensome. On the other hand, if the parties believe that the dispute is very important, they may want it decided according to law, with detailed factual findings and a written opinion. Perhaps, as in the context of securities arbitration, one party fears that its inferior bargaining power will compromise its rights in a forum in which the opposing party exerts substantial influence. Regardless, establishing alternatives allows the parties to designate the best forum for the resolution of a particular dispute.
Private parties, however, cannot be expected, to safeguard institutional interests and legislative policies when choosing a method of dispute resolution. This problem has been further exacerbated by the Supreme Court's strong encouragement of arbitration in recent years. Perhaps the Court would not be as enthusiastic about the arbitration of certain categories of disputes if an alternative were available that could provide some degree of substantive protection without taxing judicial resources. In this respect, the NJADR Act procedures are a convenient compromise: if a party challenged an agreement to arbitrate and important rights were implicated in the dispute, the courts could have an alternative to arbitration. Of course, a court could not arbitrarily void an arbitration agreement between the parties, but it could conceivably require more formalized procedures in the name of public policy.
Once jurisdiction has been established, differences begin to appear between NJADR Act procedures and those of AAA commercial arbitration. In demanding the resolution of the dispute, a party must provide written notice setting forth all claims, defenses, and the relief sought."" The notice given an opposing party is thus sufficiently informative to permit a fair development of both sides of the argument; at a minimum, the opposing party knows its position relative to the complainant before further communication is undertaken.
Umpires
The process of choosing an umpire, as the judges are called under the NJADR Act, differs from the selection of arbitrators under AAA rules. Only one umpire is appointed according to a pre-established procedure set forth in the contract, which either designates the umpire or describes a process for her selection. 185 She need not have legal training."' If the parties fail to agree upon an umpire for any reason, then the state Superior Court may appoint one in a summary action and set her hourly fee if the rate of pay has not been designated by the parties.1 8 7
The umpire's scope of authority is identical to that of an arbitrator and follows the Prima Paint Rule. 88 An important modification under the NJADR Act is to vest in the umpire the power to grant provisional remedies as if she were an inferior state court operating under the state constitution.' 8 9 Since significant amounts of money could be tied up through these measures by the order of a legally untrained umpire, the court reviews and enforces the granting of provisional remedies in an expedited proceeding.' 90 Bestowing this remedial power on umpires is intended to reduce the amount of ancillary litigation over procedural matters that may develop in a dispute otherwise properly diverted to ADR.' 91
Prehearing Procedures
Prehearing procedures under the NJADR Act have been augmented to facilitate factual development sufficient to allow the correct application of substantive law. One modification of AAA rules is a provision allowing formalized discovery, but limiting it to oral depositions and the production of documents, all of which must be completed within sixty days after receipt of the demand for alternate resolution or the entry of a final order compelling alternate resolution.' 92 Although both the time limit and the permissible methods of discovery are subject to expansion according to the umpire's discretion,' 93 such a rule seems to be an apt compromise. The procedure minimizes the escalating cost and frustration associated with discovery requests;"' rather than depending upon the parties' voluntary cooperation with each other at a time when it may not be forthcoming, mandatory discovery will ensure a fair and equal opportunity to construct a case so that the umpire can better evaluate the claims. In some disputes presently subject to arbitration, discovery is essential to a fair contest on the merits.
1 95 Recognizing the frequently realized potential for abusive delays in conventional discovery processes, however, the Act sharply limits its parameters. 96 The goal is to provide some semblance of the factual development attained in litigation, but at a reduced cost. Because the parties submit briefs to the umpire stating the factual and legal issues to be resolved, each party must "undertake a detailed factual development of its case." 7 The parties' submissions limit the matters to be resolved at the hearing, but supplementary briefs are permitted at the umpire's discretion. 9 Unless the parties have access through discovery to relevant materials possessed by the other side, the briefs and subsequent findings by the umpire are likely to be incomplete,. if not inaccurate. Furthermore, the ability of the umpire to fashion a more creative resolution of the dispute than the law allows is curtailed, because both the facts and the law relevant to the decision are limited to those covered by the briefs. Applicable law is set forth for the umpire and she is bound to adhere to it. In making her award, an umpire is compelled to consider only matters that the parties believe apposite. Finally, the briefs are more likely to present a balanced view of the dispute than would the "position papers" employed in the arbitration forum for the same purpose. 1 99
The only technical rules of evidence applicable to dispute resolution under the NJADR Act are those relating to privilege. 2 00 One small procedural exception that has a large substantive effect, however, is the power of the umpire to call an expert witness at the expense of the parties. 2 " 1 This provision is particularly important because the umpire need not be an expert in the subject matter of the dispute, and, given 195 See Shell, supra note 104, at A3, col. 3. A survey of attorneys with experience in arbitration of construction disputes revealed that 80% wanted discovery by the arbitrator to be permitted. See STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 126, at 6. applied, are to impart a high degree of predictability to ADR, to guarantee the quality of the decision by eliminating any temptation to compromise, and to facilitate subsequent judicial review. 210 The apparently solid foundation of this section provides promise for efficient procedures explicitly aimed at increasing predictable, quality results. 2 "' Proponents of arbitration use this provision as an easy target. They argue that the NJADR Act compromises the very finality that motivates parties to choose ADR over litigation by facilitating review. By requiring adherence to substantive law, they suggest, persons without legal training are held to an extremely high standard, perhaps precluding them from serving as umpires. They also argue, most broadly, that it is an unnecessary legalization of the arbitration process. 
Review
The drafters of the NJADR Act insist that the provision for only a single expedited appeal from an umpire's decision213 improves upon the finality offered by arbitration, because arbitration may actually serve as a preliminary to litigation in many cases anyway. 214 AAA rules seek to enhance finality by obscuring the substantive basis of an arbitrator's decision; the NJADR Act accomplishes the same end by enhancing the substantive quality of the process while limiting the availability of review. Whether the total burden on the courts will be less than that inflicted by appeals from arbitration remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
In the real world of commercial disputes, comparative analyses of arbitration, litigation, and the new forum under the NJADR Act are irrelevant unless the parties actually choose the most efficient forum for 210 See id. § 2A:23A-12, at 47 (Draftsman's Legislative History). 211 See id. 212 See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 39, at 1, 20 (Some in the arbitration industry say that the NJADR Act's appeal provision would defeat the purpose of arbitration.); Naiman, supra note 39, at 3 (The NJADR Act would discourage the use of nonlawyers as arbitrators, and would unnecessarily legalize the arbitration process.); see also Sterk, supra note 75, at 484 n.9 (The desire to maintain confidence in the system of arbitration serves as "an incentive for a resolution that seems equitable to the parties and a disincentive to consider factors extraneous to justice between the parties."). (an award can be modified or reversed if it is not in accordance with applicable law). 214 See supra note 66; cf. Standard Chlorine of Del., Inc. v. Leonard, 384 F.2d 304, 305 (2d Cir. 1967) ("Arbitration is often thought of as a quick and efficient method for determining controversies. Unfortunately, cases involving arbitration clauses sometimes are best remembered as monuments to delay because of the litigation and appeals antecedent to the actual arbitration.").
[Vol. 136:1723 the resolution of a particular dispute. When inserting a dispute resolution clause into their agreement, contracting parties probably will not strike a conscious balance between expeditious repose and qualitative results. Faced with a host of disincentives to litigation, they may initially choose arbitration as the most efficient process, only to regret the choice later and attempt to appeal their way back into the jurisdiction of the courts. This result is the most inefficient: arbitration becomes a mere preliminary to litigation.
If disputants understood the ramifications of process choice in all situations, however, they presumably would choose the formality of the courts over the informality of ADR, all else being equal. But because all else is not equal, contracting parties frequently opt to risk a virtually unreviewable decision that may be contrary to applicable law in order to achieve quick repose. When private parties of equivalent bargaining power enter the arbitration forum with eyes fully open in order to resolve routine commercial disputes, the futile appeals that may follow are merely a procedural inefficiency. The real problem is that the range of arbitrable claims has been steadily expanding in recent years, subsuming disputes of a nature that commercial arbitration was not designed to resolve. When a party is dragged unwillingly into a forum where claims need not be decided according to law, and the party never even contemplated that a particular type of claim would be arbitrated, the near futility of appeal raises disturbing substantive issues.
Rather than abandoning ADR altogether, a new ADR forum should be created for certain categories of disputes. 21 5 Although striking a balance between quantitative and qualitative results has not been the goal of any particular constituency, 2 16 such a reform has become imperative with the growth of the ADR movement and the concomitant concern that substantive principles are being ignored in favor of simple dispute resolution. Amending the Federal Arbitration Act and state statutes to require adherence to substantive law cannot accomplish this goal, because the informality of the arbitration forum is currently wellsuited to the resolution of simple commercial disputes. Thus, commercial arbitration and the procedures created by the NJADR Act need not be mutually exclusive. Rather, each forum has a discrete clientele: arbitration can resolve disputes in which relatively little is at stake between the parties and the issues are routine, and the NJADR Act's 216 See Fuller, supra note 60, at 389 ("[B]efore we demand of lay arbiters that they act like judges, we must place them in a context, and arm them with procedures, that will make it possible for them to do their job properly and still act throughout like judges."). 216 See Brunet, supra note 8, at 51.
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